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The merited fame of John Adams rests in no inconsiderable part
upon his authorship of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780. Article XXX of that historic document expressly
applied the doctrine of separation of powers to the government of the
commonwealth ". . . to the end it may be a government of laws and
not of men." 1 In eschewing this high-sounding declaration, Woodrow
Wilson said: "There never was such a government. Constitute them
how you will, governments are always governments of men, and no
part of any government is better than the men to whom that part is
intrusted. . . So far as the individual is concerned, a constitutional
government is as good as its courts; no better, no worse. Its laws
are only its professions. It keeps its promises, or does not keep them,
in its courts. For the individual, therefore, who stands at the centre
of every definition of liberty, the struggle for constitutional govern-
ment is a struggle for goods laws, indeed, but also for intelligent, inde-
pendent, and impartial courts." 2
In a very practical sense, Wilson was right. All branches of the
business of government are thoroughly human. Men make the law,
whether by formal legislation or in the process of adjudication, and
men execute and enforce the law. And even if there be a transcendental
natural law, it falls to frail mortals to identify and apply it in the con-
duct of the affairs of men. There are, however, at least two elements
of great significance to the rule of law in Adams' rhetorical phrases.
In the first place, separation of powers and checks and balances are
calculated to promote objectivity both in the formulation of the law
and in its administration. Under such a system, the law-giver must
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1. "In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may be a goverment of laws and not of men." MAss. CONST. pt. 1,
art. xxx. Adams was the principal draftsman of the entire Constitution of 1780.
See A MANUAL FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1917 at 20 et seq. (2d ed.
1917).
2. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNrrIE STATES 17 (1908).
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provide a reasonably intelligible guide for those who are to interpret
and effectuate the law, and the individual is likely to have more than one
governmental recourse when faced with the necessity of reconciling
governmental authority with his individual interests. In the second
place, Adams, in effect, bespoke an independent judiciary.
To the individual, the rule of law means that he lives in a po-
litically organized society, which has achieved a relatively high degree
of objectivity and evenhandedness in its substantive law, which, in turn,
is given vitality by the existence of an independent judiciary guided by
the concept of procedural due process and true to the proposition that
government and public officials are subject to the rule of law.' With
respect to all three of these vitalizing elements, the influence of John
Marshall was, as we shall see, both substantial and salutary.
"The Reconciliation of Government with Liberty" 4 is a never
ending challenge in any well-developed society. Its focus, however, can
and does shift. Early in this century the greater stress in America
was upon economic freedom. Men were concerned with preserving
maximum freedom in economic action and were very sensitive to gov-
ernmental intervention. Perhaps there has been no stronger state-
ment of this point of view than the criticism Professor John W. Burgess
made of the sixteenth amendment. Said the alarmed professor:
"The vast importance of this subject is revealed when we
reflect that a tax on incomes, which may be laid without any con-
stitutional limitations, puts all property and all human effort at
the mercy of the governmental body which may lay such a tax.
It is not like any other tax. Other taxes cover only a part of the
property or a part of the labor or activity of the individual. But
the unlimited income tax takes the whole thing or may take the
whole thing at the option of the Government. In fact, since the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment we have no real constitu-
tional Government upon that most important of all subjects, the
relation of Government to the Individual's right to property." '
3. The term "rule of law" is difficult to define exactly. A. V. Dicey, an English
law professor of the nineteenth century is credited with its classic formulation. He
defined it as meaning "in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land . . . [and, in the
second place] not only that with us no man is above the law, but .(what is a
different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject
to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
tribunals." Dicay, LAW OF THE CoNsTTTruo 183-89 (8th ed. 1915). Mr. Justice
Brandeis' version is that "the supremacy of the law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied;
and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (concurring
opinion).
4. This is the title of a book published by Professor John W. Burgess of
Columbia University in 1915. See note 5 infra.
5. BuRGEss, THE RECONCILTATION OF GOVENmMENT wrrH LimER T 369-70 (1915).
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While there are those who, at this day, are attacking graduated or
progressive income taxation with Burgess-like zeal 6 and while, quite
apart from that controversy, the economic branch of the larger problem
is certainly still with us, international tensions, the war of ideas, and
the resulting concern over national security have rendered relatively
much more acute the problem of reconciling "security and civil liberty."
What role should the legal profession play in this vital process?
In broad terms the answer seems clear through. In keeping with the
great traditions of the profession in England and America, the bar's
pre-eminent concern should be with liberty. This is far from taking
the position that lawyers should be insensitive to security matters. It
does mean that security programs and administration are not their
special professional responsibility, while human liberty very definitely
is. Those who share these views can derive encouragement from the
ideas and example of John Marshall.
That a man of Marshall's outlook has meant much to civil liberty
is especially noteworthy. He was not a small "d" democrat. He was not
a champion of the rights of man. He was, in short, not a civil liber-
tarian. One notes with interest his very casual treatment, in his Life
of Washington, of the adoption of the first ten amendments.7 Again,
we find him opposing the Alien and Sedition Laws," not on civil liber-
ties grounds but because he considered them unwise-he viewed them
as provocative and damaging to public morale and national unity.'
His contribution lay in his deep lawyer-like devotion to a rule of
law, whose ultimate minister is the courts. He powerfully strengthened
the American tradition of ready access to the courts for protection of
the rights of the individual.
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
In Marshall's day, our courts had not achieved their present de-
gree of detachment from political controversy. Certainly this was true
of the courts of the fledgling national government. It was common-
6. See the so-called Reed-Dirksen Amendment, a proposal to limit federal tax-
ing power by constitutional amendment. S.J. RES. 23, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
7. 5 MARSHALL, THE LiFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 207-10 (1st ed. 1807); 2 id.
at 165-67 (2d ed. 1839).
8. For Alien Acts of June 18, June 25, and July 6, 1798, see 1 STAT. 566, 570,
577 (1845). For Sedition Law of July 14, 1798, see id. at 596.
9. "I am not an advocate for the alien and sedition bills; had I been in Congress
when they passed, I should, unless my judgment could have been changed, certainly
have opposed them. Yet, I do not think them fraught with all those mischiefs
which many gentlemen ascribe to them. I should have opposed them because I
think them useless; and because they are calculated to create unnecessary discontents
and jealousies at a time when our very existence, as a nation, may depend on
our union. . . ." Marshall's Aiswers to Freeholder's Qiwstionm in 2 BEvEmDGE,
THE LIFE OF JoHN MARsHALL 575, 577 (1916).
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place for violent political criticism to be aimed at the judges and the
courts. The judges, for their part, were disposed to speak out with
extraordinary freedom on controversial political questions. Notable
instances may be found in addresses to grand juries made by Justices
of the Supreme Court while riding the circuit.' Even the hero-
worshipping Beveridge acknowledged the fundamentally political qual-
ity of Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison."
That the great Chief Justice had the strength of character, mind,
and purpose to lead the federal courts through this difficult period into
a position of vital importance in the entire governmental scheme of
things is schoolboy learning. It would be tedious for the reader were
the story of Marshall's role in making the Federal Constitution an
effective organic instrument of national union retold here. What should
be said is that from the standpoint of human liberty under a rule of
law, history has confirmed that the Marshall Court did not go beyond
the appropriate reach of judicial independence in firmly establishing
judicial competence to pass on the constitutionality of legislation. This
was significant not alone to the emergence of a strong national govern-
ment within the federal framework, not alone to the accommodation
of horizontal clashes in the central government, but also to the effec-
tuation in the American system of any adequate conception of the rule
of law. Without judicial review, there would not have been inde-
pendent tribunals with adequate authority to deny effect to arbitrary
executive and legislative action which flouted the rule of law." Mar-
shall and his brethren did not have occasion to exercise this authority
in behalf of civil liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, but they
validated the basic doctrine. The federal courts have ever since enjoyed
the independence needed to afford the individual adequate recourse to
maintain the constitutional rule of law.
Marshall was an eloquent champion of an independent judiciary
at the state level. In 1829, he served as a member of the Virginia
constitutional convention. There he strongly espoused judicial tenure
of office during good behavior. We reproduce a notable passage:
"Advert, sir, to the duties of a judge,-he has to pass be-
tween the Government and the man whom that Government is
10. See, e.g., 2 McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 551-70
(1858); Fordham, Iredell's Dissent in Chishohn v. Georgia: Its Political Significance,
8 N.C. HisT. Rsv. 155, 156 (1931); 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrED
STATES HISTORY 275-76 (rev. ed. 1926).
11. 3 BEvERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 132-42.
12. We do not mean to say that the power of the courts to declare legislative
acts unconstitutional is essential to the survival of the rule of law. In England
where there is no such authority, there is nonetheless an enviable record of maintain-
ing basic liberties. The present Lord Chancellor of England has discussed the
British situation in Fyfe, The Executive and the Rule of Law, 9 N.Y. CITY BAR
Ass'z; REC. 358 (1954).
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prosecuting; between the most powerful individual in the com-
munity, and the poorest and most unpopular. . . . The Judicial
Department comes home in its effects to every man's fireside:
it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not,
to the last degree important, that he should be rendered perfectly
and completely independent, with nothing to influence or controul
him but God and his conscience? You do not allow a man to
perform the duties of a juryman or a Judge, if he has one dollar of
interest in the matter to be decided: and will you allow a Judge to
give a decision when his office may depend upon it? when his
decision may offend a powerful and influential man? . . . If
they may be removed at pleasure, will any lawyer of distinction
come upon your bench? No, sir. I have always thought, from
my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people,
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary." 13
An essential concomitant of an independent judiciary is an inde-
pendent bar. It is not too much to say that an independent bar is the
vital guardian of individual liberty. The late Mr. Justice Jackson
put the matter with characteristic felicity when he said that we shall
preserve individual freedoms only so long as there is access to the offices
of lawyers with genuine independence of action.'" In times of stress
and strong public feeling against unpopular persons and causes, lawyers
find it necessary to stand firmly as a group to support the principle of
the right to counsel. It is then that the organized bar has a special
responsibility to maintain the principle. Should it fail in this, the rule
of law would break down.
There is no basis for supposing that Marshall was any less sensi-
tive to the need of an independent bar than of the essentiality of an
independent judiciary. This is borne out, one may suggest, by his
conduct of the trial of Aaron Burr.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "The history of liberty has
largely been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards." "
13. PRocEEDINGs AND DERATEs OF THE VMGINIA STATE CONVmENToN op 1829-30,
at 615-19 (1830). See also Marshall's defense of the "judiciary clause of the
Federal Constitution, summarized in 1 BEmVERIGE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 450-61.
He repeatedly hammered the theme that, in national as in state courts, justice
would be secured by reason of the independence of the judiciary. He also asserted
the authority and duty of the federal courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress, thus anticipating the decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. This is reported from memory. One of the authors of this paper heard Mr.
Justice Jackson make the point in an eloquent address before the Columbus, Ohio,
Bar Association some seven years ago.
15. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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John Marshall's conduct in the proceedings arising out of the Burr
conspiracy indicates his concurrence with this proposition. The at-
mosphere of political tension in which those proceedings took place
was calculated to put fair procedure and judicial impartiality to the
test. That they stood the strain is a lesson for our time.
Historians have not been certain as to Burr's intent. They are
satisfied that he hoped to bring about a war with Spain and drive the
Spaniards from Mexico. Whether he seriously contemplated the
dismemberment of the union is a matter of dispute. President Jefferson
believed that he did, and the great mass of the public shared the
belief.'
In the wake of the public hysteria over the Burr plot, martial law
was decreed in New Orleans, and a number of people were summarily
arrested. Among these were Erich Bollman and Samuel Swartwout,
two alleged accomplices of Burr. In defiance of writs of habeas corpus
issued from the Supreme Court of New Orleans Territory and the
United States District Court in Charleston, where they stopped en
route, Bollman and Swartwout were hurried to Washington under
military arrest. Here their commitment on a charge of treason was
ordered by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, but not with-
out a noble dissent by Judge William Cranch, who said:
"In times like these when the public mind is agitated, .. . it
is the duty of a Court to be particularly watchful lest the public
feeling should reach the seat of justice. . . . It then becomes
the duty of the Judiciary calmly to poise the scales of justice, un-
moved by the armed power, undisturbed by the clamor of the
multitude." "
Bollman and Swartwout at once applied to the Supreme Court for
a writ of habeas corpus.'8 The Court determined that there was not
sufficient evidence of a levying of war to justify the commitment for
treason and ordered that the prisoners be discharged. It was able to
16. See 3 BEVrmuDGE, op. cit. m.pra note 9, at 324 et seq. General Wilkinson,
the American commander at New Orleans and a confidante of Burr, had written
Jefferson denouncing Burr as contemplating dismemberment of the union. Instead
of quietly ordering his arrest, the President, on November 27, 1806, issued a procla-
mation declaring that a conspiracy had been uncovered and calling for the seizure
of the conspirators. Later (January 22, 1807) in a special message to Congress,
the President stated that Burr's "guilt is placed beyond question." The great mass
of the people accepted Jefferson's charge as true.
17. Quoted from 1 WARmE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 303 (1926).
18. The Court could not help but sense the height of public feeling over the
supposed treason of Burr and his accomplices. It even swayed members of Con-
gress. A bill suspending the writ of habeas corpus for three months actually passed
the Senate only to be defeated in the House. A resolution was also introduced to
deprive the Supreme Court of power to issue habeas corpus, but it, too was defeated.
See, 1 WARmEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 302-07.
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overcome an objection to jurisdiction on the ground that, unlike
Marbury v. Madison, this case involved a species of appellate review
on a habeas corpus vehicle. The Chief Justice observed that "as there
is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men
than treason, no charge demands more from the tribunal before which
it is made, a deliberate and temperate inquiry." "
Meanwhile, the central figure in the conspiracy, Aaron Burr, the
former Vice-President of the United States, had been apprehended.
The fact that he had been publicly labeled a traitor by the President of
the United States was enough for the common man. As Beveridge
put it, "the popular voice demanded the life of Aaron Burr. No mere
trial in court, no adherence to rules of evidence, no such insignificant
fact as the American Constitution, must be permitted to stand between
the people's aroused loyalty and the miscreant whom the Chief Execu-
tive of the Nation had pronounced guilty of treason." 20
Burr was brought before Marshall sitting as a judge of the United
States Circuit Court for the District of Virginia. At the preliminary
hearing, Marshall ruled that there was insufficient evidence of treason,
but that he would commit Burr for high misdemeanor. When the
amount of the bail to be fixed was being argued, Burr's counsel observed
that several respectable gentlemen who had no fear that Burr would
keep his recognizance nonetheless were unwilling to post bail "lest it
might be supposed they were enemies to their country." 21 Guilt by
association is not an injustice confined to the twentieth century! Over
the protest of the prosecution, Marshall fixed bail at $10,000.
The grand jury, however, found indictments against Burr both
for treason, in that he had levied war against the United States, and
for misdemeanor, in that he had set on foot an armed expedition
against Spanish territory in violation of the neutrality laws.2 The
alleged overt act of levying war against the United States was that
Burr, with upwards of thirty others on December 10 and 11, 1806,
had assembled on Blennerhasset's Island in the Ohio River and that
this aggregation of men "armed and arrayed in a warlike manner" did
"traitorously . . . join themselves together against the said United
States." 2
The trial itself began before Marshall on August 3, 1807. So
great was the public prejudice that it was impossible to select an un-
19. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807).
20. 3 BEVERmIGE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 342.
21. 1 REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BuRR 19 (Robertson 1808).
22. Id. at 306.
23. The indictment is set forth in full in 1 ROBERTSON, TRIAL OF AARON Buiu
FOR TEASONo 482-84 (1875).
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biased jury. After almost two weeks of challenges and wrangles, twelve
men were finally selected who, if not unprejudiced, were at least less
prejudiced than most." The government put on a number of wit-
nesses who testified to an assemblage of from twenty to thirty men on
Blennerhasset's Island, that some arms were in evidence, and that boats
and supplies had been gathered. It was conceded that Burr himself
had been two hundred miles away at the time. The government then
indicated an intention to introduce evidence showing Burr's connec-
tion with the events on Blennerhasset's Island. The defense moved
that, since no overt act on the part of Burr had been proved by two
witnesses, collateral testimony as to Burr's designs should not be
received.
After long and emotion-packed argument, the Chief Justice made
his ruling, granting the defense motion.25 In this opinion, the Chief
Justice took cognizance of the hue and cry for conviction and of the
threats of his impeachment if Burr were to go free:
"That this court dares not usurp power, is most true. That this
court dares not shrink from its duty, is not less true. . . No
man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny. No
man, might he let the bitter cup pass from him, without self-
reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he have no choice
in the case; if there is no alternative presented to him but a derelic-
tion of duty, or the opprobrium of those who are denominated
the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of
his country, who can hesitate which to embrace." 20
The jury retired and promptly returned a verdict of "Not Guilty."
Though the proceedings were to drag on for another three weeks, the
trial of Aaron Burr was, for practical purposes, at an end." The Chief
24. See 3 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 483.
25. United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807). The government
theory was that, because of the common-law doctrine that "in treason all are
principals," Burr was legally, though not physically present. On this theory, once
the overt act of a treasonous assesmblage had been proved by the testimony of two
witnesses, the constitutional test had been met, and Burr's connection with it could
be proved by any sort of legal evidence. Marshall, however, ruled that since Burr
was not present, the government must also prove, by the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act, that Burr had procured the assemblage. Marshall's interpreta-
tion of this constitutional point has been criticized. See CoRwiN, Jo HN MARSHALL
AND THE CoNsmuTiox 103-10 (1921). But the validity of Marshall's reasoning
is, for our purposes, irrelevant.
26. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 506-07.
27. Following Burr's acquittal, the government nol prossed the treason indict-
ments of Blennerhasset and the others. The conspirators were then tried and
acquitted of the misdemeanor charges contained in the second set of indictments.
The prosecution then moved to commit Burr and his associates on a charge of
treason within the jurisdiction of the United States Court for the District of Ohio.
After more arguments and more witnesses, Marshall refused to hold them on
the treason charges, but held them on the misdemeanor charges. These were never
pressed.
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
Justice, no less than Burr, had been on trial. Every ruling he made
was the object of attack. He came off well because he preserved the
integrity of the judicial process by conducting an essentially fair and
orderly trial despite the general atmosphere of intense political and
emotional tension. Thus did he give us a worthy example of pro-
cedural due process.
THE SUBORDINATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS TO THE RULE OF LAW
It will be remembered that in Marbury v. Madison, Marshall's
opinion disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds-the Court could
not grant a writ of mandamus since the pertinent provision of the
Judiciary Act, which purported to add to the Court's constitutional,
original jurisdiction was unconstitutional in this respect. Thus, it can
be said that there was no occasion to consider the question whether a
cabinet officer was amenable to such a writ. But Marshall did, and
where he came out we all know. He formulated his conclusions as
follows: ". . . where the heads of departments are the political or
confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a con-
stitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear, than
that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific
duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the per-
formance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his
country for a remedy." "
To say that this pronouncement was gratuitous is now quite aca-
demic. The vitality of its influence is the important thing, and there
can be scant doubt that, like the decision of the English judges in the
famous case of Ashby v. White, 9 it has been a stout support for the
rule of law. It has meant in round terms, that executive officers,
subordinate only to the President himself, are answerable in the courts
of law for denial of the legal rights of an individual.
It is a matter of great contemporary interest that the Secretary
of State is again in the posture of Madison-this time in three cases
involving denial of applications for passports30 The upshot of these
cases is that, as a constitutional matter, the Secretary does not have a
discretion as to substance or procedure in the issuance or denial of
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
29. 2 Ld. Raymond 938, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (1703). See 10 HoLDswoRTH,
HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 539 (1938).
30. Shachtman v. Dulles, No. 12727, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1955; Dulles v. Nathan,
No. 12727, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1955; Foreman v. Dulles, Civil No. 4924-54, D.D.C.,
June 28, 1955.
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passports which is beyond judicial scrutiny. Formerly a passport was
simply a document identifying one as an American citizen and be-
speaking for him free and safe passage.' Under such a dispensation,
the issuance of a passport was understandably treated as an exclusively
political matter. The situation under present legislation and regulations
is quite different; it is now unlawful for a citizen to travel to Europe,
for example, without a passport.a2
The basic substantive idea is that the liberty safeguarded by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment embraces freedom to travel
abroad. This significant position was taken by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia without dissent. Once we arrive at that
point, the rule of law does not suffer the freedom of a citizen to travel
abroad to be left to the absolute discretion of an executive officer.
"[T]he government may not arbitrarily restrain the liberty of a citizen
to travel to Europe. Discretionary power does not carry with it the
right to its arbitrary exercise." '
The right to travel is conceded to be subject to reasonable regula-
tion. Since travel of our citizens abroad may have a bearing upon
national security and the conduct of foreign affairs, that factor may
be taken into account in regulating the issuance of passports. In all of
these cases the rub was State Department concern over the political
ideas and associations of the passport applicants.
Shachtman v. Dulles 4 was a suit instituted in the District Court
for the District of Columbia to enjoin the Secretary of State from deny-
ing the application of the plaintiff for a passport to visit Europe and
for a declaratory judgment. The district court sustained a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and the further ground that since a denial
was in the proper exercise of the Secretary's discretion, the court lacked
jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed; the court held that the
passport had been denied on a stated ground that was legally insufficient.
What the complaint showed, as apprehended by the court of appeals,
was that the Secretary refused the passport application solely because
an organization headed by the plaintiff had been listed by the Attorney
General as subversive and that, apart from such listing, plaintiff's con-
nection with the organization would not have been considered by the
Secretary as ground for rejecting his application. The complaint alleged
31. See Note, 3 STAN. L. Rxv. 312 (1951). Quite apart from the question of
legality of departure from this country is the practical problem of legality of entry
into another; it is pretty generally required now that aliens seeking entry have
passports. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952).
32. 66 STAT. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1952) ; 22 C.F.R. §53.1 et seq. (1949).
33. Shachtman v. Dulles, No. 12727, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1955, at 5.
34. No. 12727, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1955.
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further that the plaintiff's organization was not subversive and that
it had sought unsuccessfully for six years to have an opportunity to
demonstrate this fact to the Attorney General. On this state of the
case the court of appeals concluded that the denial of the application,
judged solely on the basis of the plaintiff's allegations, constituted a
deprivation of liberty in denial of substantive due process.
The court in this case did not order that the passport be issued.
It reversed and remanded with the effect of imposing the burden upon
the Secretary to answer the complaint. Whether by answer he could
assert a legally sufficient ground for his action remained to be seen.
In each of the other two cases, it was determined at the district
court level that the applicant for a passport was entitled to an appro-
priate hearing on his application. In one of these cases, the Secretary
took an appeal.?5 The court of appeals issued an order reciting "that
the appellee applied for a passport some two and a half years ago and
was never accorded an evidentiary hearing or confronted with the
evidence, if any, which led to the denial of a passport." It stayed an
order of the court below requiring the issuance of a passport after
failure of the Secretary to afford a hearing, on the condition that the
Department provide an appropriate hearing within a limited time. The
form of this order is of such interest as to bear reproduction below3 6
Before the time expired, the Department proceeded voluntarily to issue
a passport. On a showing to that effect before the court of appeals,
the case was dismissed as moot.
35. Dulles v. Nathan, No. 12727, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1955.
36. "It is Oanmzn by the Court that the said order of the District Court
entered June 1, 1955, be, and it hereby is, stayed until further order of this court,
PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
(1) That the Department of State accord a quasi judicial hearing on the ap-
pellee's application for a passport, with opportunity provided to the government and
to the appellee to offer evidence, such hearing to be commenced on or before Tuesday,
June 7, and to be concluded within three days unless this Court upon application
extends the time;
(2) That the hearing officer or officers render a report and recommendation,
based on the record of such hearing, within five days after the conclusion of the
hearing;
(3) That the appellee be immediately furnished with a copy of such report and
recommendation, and be allowed three days within which to file objections thereto
with the Department of State;
(4) That within ten days after the rendition of such report and recommendation,
action be taken by the Department of State, either granting or denying a passport,
and a statement of such action be immediately furnished to appellee and to this
Court;
(5) That if a passport is denied, the State Department immediately either (a)
inform this Court and the appellee with particularity of the reasons for such denial
or (b) show cause to this Court with particularity for any failure to supply such
reasons.
After final action by the Department of State this Court will consider what
further action on its part, if any, is necessary." Id. at 2-3.
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In the other case, the district court found that the applicant had
been granted an "informal hearing" which consisted exclusively of an
interrogation of the applicant without production of any evidence or
witness against him, no stenographic record being made although re-
quested by the applicant, and without disclosure to him of the record
or report on the basis of which his application was disapproved. The
court concluded that the "denial to the plaintiff of a passport without
an appropriate hearing was a denial of due process of law. . . ." The
court accordingly ordered the Secretary to accord plaintiff a quasi-
judicial hearingY
If these rulings stand, the individual citizen henceforth effectively
can insist that if a passport is to be denied him, it can be done only
after a fair hearing and only for a legally sufficient ground consistent
with substantive due process. It does not seem at all far-fetched to
say that these cases are within the great Marshall tradition of sub-
ordinating governmental officials to the rule of law and of assuring
the individual recourse to the courts in matters affecting his liberty.
The expression "equal justice under law" may be regarded by
some as a badly overworked clich6, but it is a good summary statement
of what Marshall stands for under the American rule of law. It
articulates a very important principle in the value system of a people.
We have been able to give that principle what has been, for the most
part, faithful application because we have had the judicial institutions
and processes and the independent bar essential to that end. Marshall
made an enduring contribution to the protection of the rights of man by
his service in rooting those institutions and processes deeply in our
political and legal system.
37. Foreman v. Dulles, Civil No. 4924-54, D.D.C., June 28, 1955. The order
was patterned on that of the court of appeals in the Nathan case.
